OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUMMARY OF
REPORTS ISSUED AND
PARTICIPATION ON MANAGEMENT ADVISORY TEAMS
AND SPECIAL AUDIT/EVALUATION EFFORTS

JULY, AUGUST, AND SEPTEMBER 2003

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I - REPORTS ISSUED
JULY, AUGUST, AND SEPTEMBER 2003

(REPORTS ARE UNCLASSIFIED UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

PART I

REPORT SUMMARIES

ACQUISITION PROGRAM

REPORT NO. D-2003-128. The Chemical Demilitarization Program: Increased Costs for Stockpile and Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Disposal Programs. The report discusses factors that continue to affect the cost and schedule of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (Program) and the need to plan for the disposal of non-stockpile chemical materiel. Through May 2003, the Army awarded contracts totaling $5.7 billion for the construction, systemization, operations, and closure of seven chemical agent disposal facilities and planned two additional disposal facilities.

The Director, Chemical Materials Agency had made substantial progress in managing the cost growth for the Demilitarization Program; however, several issues could affect the future program cost and schedule of the Program and the disposal of the non-stockpile chemical materiel. Specifically:

o The Director's ability to effectively control the cost estimate of the Program continues to be affected by delays in obtaining State permit modifications needed for beginning disposal operations, monetary effects of decisions on the type of technology to be employed at two Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment facilities, the escalation in costs and safety incidents at operational chemical disposal facilities, and rising cost estimates for closure of disposal facilities.

o The Product Manager for Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel did not have information needed to prepare a reliable estimate of the cost and schedule to dispose of buried chemical warfare materiel. Direction to the environmental offices of the DoD Components will cause DoD Components to identify, schedule, and fund the disposal of buried chemical warfare materiel from existing and former DoD installations. Implementation of the direction will also result in a reliable and defendable estimate of the cost to dispose of the buried chemical warfare materiel for the contingent liability in Note 16 of the DoD financial statements.

REPORT NO. D-2003-129. Assessment of DoD Leasing Actions. The assessment resulted from a request initiated by the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. The request was based on a letter from the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S. Senate, urging the Secretary of Defense to ask us to perform a review on aspects of the plan to lease Boeing 767 tanker aircraft.

Although not required by statute, applying a best business practice of weighing the need to conduct a formal analysis of alternatives to achieve the best possible system solution could have improved the Air Force Leasing process. Further, a best business practice would have been to expand the charter of the Leasing Review Panel to include the Panel's role in the acquisition process and in the life cycles of the leases.

REPORT NO. D-2003-132. Air Force Transition of Advanced Technology Programs to Military Applications. This report evaluates the Air Force's current process for enhancing the likelihood that emerging technology would reach the warfighter. In 1999, the Commander of Air Force Materiel Command established the Applied Technology Councils for advanced technology demonstrations to facilitate the transition of technology projects to the warfighter. We examined 30 Science and Technology (S&T) projects (24 advanced technology demonstrations and 6 critical experiments) valued at $123 million. The 30 S&T projects had additional planned funding of $222 million from FY 2004 through FY 2007.

Although the Applied Technology Councils created a General Officer and executive level review for the advanced technology demonstrations and Air Force Research Laboratory officials perform other management oversight reviews, procedures should be established to strengthen coordination for all advanced technology development funded with planned technology recipients. Although most technologies had working-level integrated product teams, the teams had not established charters to identify roles and responsibilities. Half of the technologies had not established a transition plan, most had not established agreements on technology readiness levels and exit criteria with technology recipients, 12 of the working-level integrated product teams had not documented issues and action items, and 8 of the 13 acquisition recipients had not identified the necessary funding for technologies scheduled to transition in FYs 2003 and 2004. Also, the performance appraisal process of S&T officials needs to emphasize technology transitioning as a performance element. As a result, the Air Force Research Laboratory had planned technology investments of $222 million for technologies included in this review that had not been fully coordinated with the transition recipient. In addition, the Air Force recipients had a $529 million funding shortfall for transitioning technologies scheduled for availability during FYs 2003 through 2005.

CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT

REPORT NO. D-2003-116. Summary of Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-76 Related Report Coverage From FY 1997 through FY 2002. This report discusses competitive sourcing issues associated with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-76 process.

From FY 1997 through FY 2002, the General Accounting Office (GAO) and DoD audit organizations issued 299 reports on OMB Circular No. A-76 competitions. GAO issued

33 reports, OIG DoD issued 12 reports, the Army Audit Agency issued 221 reports (75 of the 221 reports were not available and excluded from this summary because the final decision for those competitions had not been made), the Naval Audit Service issued 7 reports, the Air Force Audit Agency issued 3 reports, the Defense Commissary Agency Internal Review issued 13 reports, and the Defense Logistics Agency Internal Review issued 10 reports. The 224 reports (299 reports less 75 reports not available) address the following issues: independent review of in-house cost estimates (172 reports), source selection process (18 reports), cost savings from OMB Circular No. A-76 studies (12 reports), program oversight and implementation (10 reports), reporting commercial activities under the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act (6 reports), post-most efficient organization reviews (4 reports), and impact assessments (2 reports).

REPORT NO. D-2003-121. DoD Fire and Emergency Services Program. The report discusses how shortfalls for staffing and apparatus could adversely impact firefighter safety and installation missions. This evaluation was conducted in response to a request from the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (DUSD) (Installations and Environment). The House of Representatives Report accompanying H.R. 5010, the FY 2003 Defense Appropriations Bill states that the Committee on Appropriations was concerned that the level of fire and emergency response protection at military installations may not meet minimum safety standards for staffing, equipment, and training.

Additional missions, increased deployments, National Guard and Reserve mobilizations, and inefficient hiring processes have adversely affected fire department staffing. As a result, firefighters have worked significant overtime, which may impact the fire department's ability to accomplish its missions and lead to potential safety risks for firefighters. The DUSD (Installations and Environment) with the DoD Components should jointly update and implement DoD Instruction 6055.6 so that the instruction addresses anticipated staffing for additional missions, should establish a manpower standard that incorporates each mission assigned to the fire and emergency services program, and should establish and publish a detailed human capital strategic plan. Although DoD and the Services developed authorization levels and replacement standards for firefighting apparatus, the Services did not provide a priority during the budget process for firefighting apparatus. As a result, the Services are underfunded by approximately $550 million for meeting firefighting apparatus requirements, which could result in the apparatus in the inventory becoming unreliable and unserviceable and, more importantly, negatively impact installation missions. To ensure priority for firefighting apparatus during the budget process, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps should each develop modernization plans for their respective Service for fire and emergency services apparatus.

We also identified material management control weaknesses in that the management of fire and emergency service programs and implementation of DoD Instruction 6055.6 did not ensure that the installations were adequately staffed or resourced with sufficient fire apparatus to respond to emergencies.

FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING

REPORT NO. D-2003-118. Promptness of FY 2003 Fourth Quarter DoD Payments to the Department of the Treasury for District of Columbia Water and Sewer Services. The audit was conducted in response to Public Law 106-554, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, which requires the inspector general of each Federal agency that receives water and sewer services from the District of Columbia to report to the Congressional Appropriations Committees on the promptness of payments within 15 days of the start of each quarter.

DoD Components promptly made fourth quarter FY 2003 payments totaling $530,000 to the Department of the Treasury for District of Columbia water and sewer services. Walter Reed Army Medical Center and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency were the only DoD Components required to pay this quarter. Washington Headquarters Services, Arlington National Cemetery, Fort McNair, the Navy, and Bolling Air Force Base have credit balances because of excessive charges in prior years and were not required to make quarterly payments for the FY 2003 fourth quarter.

REPORT NO. D-2003-119. Controls Over DoD Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund Investments. The report discusses how the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) invests funds from the Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund (MERHCF). MERHCF was established to provide funds to pay for health benefits for Medicare-eligible DoD retirees, retiree family members, and survivors. On October 1, 2002, MERHCF received a deposit of $14.4 billion provided by a Treasury warrant. The $14.4 billion was intended as the first of fifty annual payments to amortize the present value of $405.6 billion of the $592 billion unfunded FY 2002 Military Retirement Health Benefits liability.

As of March 31, 2003, DFAS invested the initial $14.4 billion contribution to MERHCF in short-term securities instead of a mixture of long-term securities. As a result, MERHCF did not realize $206.7 million in potential investment income during the first 6 months of FY 2003 and continues to not earn at least $34 million a month in investment income. By investing in long-term securities versus current practices, DoD can realize an estimated $6.9 billion in additional investment income over the next 6 years. The lost investment income will have a direct and material effect on the size of the Military Retirement Health Benefits liability in future years.

REPORT NO. D-2003-122. Closing the Army's 1985 M1A1 Tank Contract (Contract Number DAAE07-85-C-A043). The audit resulted from a complaint to the Defense Hotline. The complaint cited a modification that required the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Columbus to reduce the $1.01 billion unliquidated balance in the Mechanization of Contract Administration Services (MOCAS) system to zero without performing a contract fund reconciliation. The complaint concluded that without a proper reconciliation of the balances in the MOCAS system, issuance of the modification could result in a misuse of funds. The report discusses the process of completing a contract fund reconciliation prior to closure of the Army's 1985 M1A1 Tank contract.

The allegations were substantiated. The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) inappropriately attempted to use a contract modification to adjust the MOCAS system records that were out of balance by $1.01 billion for the Army tank contract. Additionally, although DFAS Columbus did not accept the DCMA modification, it did not perform the thorough contract fund reconciliation that was needed to minimize and correct the out of balance condition. Without an adequate contract fund reconciliation, DFAS Columbus could not close the contract in the MOCAS system. Additionally, the audit showed a potential over-disbursement of $1.9 million. However, until a full reconciliation is completed, any over-disbursed amount cannot be confirmed or recovered.

To improve the process and reduce the risk of undetected over or under payments, DCMA needed to provide DFAS Columbus with a complete and validated obligation review for the total value of the contract. Upon receipt of the obligation review, DFAS Columbus needed to perform a reconciliation of total obligations in the MOCAS system and make adjustments as necessary. Additionally, DFAS Columbus needed to perform a reconciliation of total disbursements using all files and records available prior and subsequent to the transfer of the disbursing function from the Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) to the former Defense Contract Management Region, Cleveland in July 1990. In performing the reconciliation, DFAS Columbus also needed to consider data available at DFAS St. Louis and TACOM. In addition, DFAS Columbus and TACOM needed to determine whether the potential over-disbursement of $1.9 million is accurate and recoverable. Finally, DoD record retention regulations needed to be revised to conform to the requirements of the Federal Acquisition Regulation.

REPORT NO. D-2003-123. Corps of Engineers Equipment Reporting on Financial Statements for FY 2002. The report discusses the management controls that are necessary to support the financial reporting of equipment on the financial statements. For FY 2002, Property, Plant, and Equipment (PP&E) was the most significant asset reported by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in its financial statements. Equipment comprised $650.8 million of the PP&E that USACE reported.

The data USACE provided for us to use in sampling and testing the amount it reported for equipment on the FY 2002 financial statements did not include $49.3 million of equipment assets. Additionally, USACE did not maintain adequate documentation to support all of the values that were listed for the items of equipment that we reviewed. Although we were able to verify the existence and completeness of all of the equipment that we sampled, the data and valuation problems resulted in our conclusion that the value of equipment USACE reported on the FY 2002 financial statements was not sufficiently reliable. Unless corrective actions are taken the value of equipment will continue to be unreliable for future financial reporting periods.

REPORT NO. D-2003-124. Certification of a DoD Payment for Telecommunications Services. This report discusses the certification of payment for telecommunications services and associated internal control. The audit was performed in response to a request by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Deputy Chief Financial Officer. The Deputy Chief Financial Officer requested that we examine the certification of a $16.6 million payment for telecommunications services that DoD made in FY 2001, and the adequacy of internal control over the certification process. The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) management stated that they consider the $16.6 million payment a settlement of a contractor dispute.

The Defense Information Technology Contracting Organization (DITCO) September 2001 certification of a disbursement of $16.6 million for telecommunication services, made as the result of a settlement agreement, had the effect of avoiding a number of Federal Acquisition Regulation and the DoD Financial Management Regulation requirements. Specifically, at the direction of DISA management, DITCO certified the payment without researching and validating the 17,030 invoices that supported it. At the time of our audit, the research and validation remained uncompleted. Additionally, DITCO did not offset the disbursement with $12.8 million of credits the Government had earned. As a result, at least $6.3 million in overpayments were certified, and there is a risk that additional overpayments were made on the contract. To correct and improve its process, DITCO needs to apply year-end credits as they are identified and earned, to certify payments for charges according to established payment guidance, and to research the $2.2 million of invoices that were not researched. DITCO also needs to continue to work with the telecommunications contractor to obtain timely and accurate service completion notices. The $1.8 million of remaining disputed invoices past the contractual timeline for resolution should be taken by DITCO until MCIWorldCom can provide support that the disputed charges were valid.

REPORT NO. D-2003-127. Allegation of Improper Accounting for Direct Billable Hours by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. The audit was initiated in response to an allegation to the Defense Hotline. The allegation stated that DFAS management might have directed personnel to significantly reduce the billed amount of direct billable hours reported for accounting services provided to the Army during FY 2001. The allegation cited pressure from upper management to reduce customers' billable hours in order to maintain good customer relations. The allegation also raised the possibility of violations of the Anti-Deficiency Act or other laws.

DFAS Indianapolis Resource Management personnel did not bill the Army for the full cost of the services provided to them during FY 2001. DFAS Indianapolis Resource Management personnel understated the hours billed by 83,113 hours for the Army and 824 hours for various other customers, thus reducing DFAS FY 2001 collectible revenue by approximately $5.6 million. When the error was discovered, DFAS Indianapolis Resource Management personnel decided not to bill the customers for the additional revenue owed to DFAS. Also, not all adjustments to the billable hour accounts were adequately documented and approved. Formal policies and documented standard operating procedures should help DFAS maintain tighter control over accounting for billable hours. Because the Army has not reimbursed DFAS for the previously unbilled hours, the FY 2003 billing rates for all DFAS Indianapolis customers were higher than they would have been if resource management personnel had collected the $5.6 million in revenue. In our opinion, there was no violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act.

DFAS revenue was further reduced by $1.2 million in FYs 2001 and 2002 because services provided to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during that period were not reimbursed. According to personnel from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, funds were to be provided to Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) according to the Program Budget Decision 416 estimate and should have included amounts for DFAS services to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, neither WHS, nor the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff paid DFAS. As a result, DFAS did not collect approximately $661,000 in FY 2001 revenue and $551,000 in FY 2002 revenue. Because DFAS did not receive reimbursement for services provided to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, FY 2003 billing rates for all DFAS Indianapolis customers were higher than they would have been if resource management personnel had collected the $1.2 million in revenue. In our opinion, there was no violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act.

REPORT NO. D-2003-133. Controls Over DoD Closed Appropriations. The report discusses the need for increased oversight of and stronger controls over the use of closed appropriations. During FY 2001 and the first half of FY 2002, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) reported $3.1 billion (absolute value) of adjustments to closed appropriations to the U.S. Treasury.

DoD did not have fundamental controls over the use of closed appropriations. Specifically, DFAS did not maintain accurate records of closed appropriation balances and did not effectively control closed appropriation adjustments. As a result, Congressional and DoD oversight over closed appropriations was impaired, and unspent funds in closed appropriations were vulnerable to abuse. In addition, DFAS approved closed appropriation adjustments based on inaccurate balances that could have resulted in overobligations and Antideficiency Act violations and made improper adjustments to closed appropriations. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer should emphasize the importance of controls over the use of closed appropriations and monitor compliance with applicable laws and regulations. DFAS should establish specific standard procedures to ensure that accounting personnel approve only legal and proper adjustments to closed appropriations, and ensure that accounting personnel understand this new guidance. DFAS should validate the canceled balances and report any potential Antideficiency Act violations in accordance with section 1551, Title 31, United States Code.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY RESOURCES

REPORT NO. D-2003-117. Systems Inventory to Support the Financial Management Enterprise Architecture. This report discusses DoD need for a single-source repository to collect its business system information.

DoD does not have a systems inventory that is synchronized with the Financial Management Enterprise Architecture initiative and that contributes to the business monitoring and reporting requirements levied by the Office of Management and Budget. As a result, DoD does not have a single-source repository to collect its business information, reduce the burden of multiple and costly data calls, and inform its transforming initiatives. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) should establish a business systems repository and accompanying procedures for integrity verification.

LOGISTICS

REPORT NO. D-2003-120. F/A-18E/F Integrated Readiness Support Teaming (FIRST) Program. The report discusses an initiative with the Boeing Company to independently manage a total logistics support program for Navy F/A-18E/F peculiar aircraft components and focused on the $126.1 million in combined savings the Navy claimed would result in the first 5 years of the FIRST Program.

Although the Navy attempted to embody the concepts of performance-based logistics in the FIRST contract, we question the costs used to support its business case, the performance achievements the Navy will actually obtain, and the metrics used to evaluate performance. The business case used to justify award of the FIRST contract for life-cycle support of the F/A-18E/F peculiar aircraft components overstated the cost of DoD performance. As a result, the savings that the Navy claimed to support the contract award were incorrect. We calculate (using data not always available when the business case analysis (BCA) was prepared) the Naval Inventory Control Point, Philadelphia (NAVICP) BCA actually showed a cost increase for the FIRST Program of $153 million and the Naval Air Systems Command savings were only $10.2 million. Thus, the corrected Navy BCA actually showed the FIRST Program cost $142.8 million more the first 5 years than for the traditional support. Developing a methodology and issuing guidance for preparing a BCA and preparing a new BCA for the FIRST Program should determine whether the FIRST Program represents the best value for the Navy and whether exercising future contract options is appropriate.

The FIRST contract did not effectively implement the material management and reliability improvements the acquisition plan for the FIRST "performance- based" concept describes. As a result, NAVICP cannot achieve the 13 percent life-cycle cost reduction expected from the FIRST Program. In addition, FIRST Program infrastructure support costs were difficult to measure, and we calculate the Navy Working Capital Fund's portion of the FIRST Program infrastructure support costs (Boeing and Navy) was running about 77 percent (minimum) of spare part or repair cost versus the intended 34 percent. Finally, the Navy funded more than $54.4 million for inventory that it stores in the Boeing commercial warehouse to support the program, significantly reducing the performance burden on Boeing. Navy customers were also overcharged more than $12.1 million by the Navy Working Capital Fund for 114 parts reviewed. Establishing metrics and assessing Boeing's effectiveness at achieving the performance expected, tracking actual support costs as a percentage of material issued, determining whether the Navy Working Capital Fund's portion of Boeing support can be performed for the intended 34 percent, shifting responsibility for maintaining inventory to Boeing, eliminating all Navy-owned inventory, requiring Boeing to purchase all of the parts directly from the original equipment manufacturers, and charging customers prices based on actual costs should bring improvement to the shortcomings identified with the FIRST Program.

REPORT NO. D-2003-125. Condition Based Maintenance-Plus. The report discusses the DoD plan for incorporating embedded diagnostic equipment and sensors into new weapon systems and, where cost-effective, legacy weapon systems in order to reduce the maintenance costs and thereby reduce total DoD ownership costs. This audit was initiated to determine whether DoD was still achieving the maintenance savings from reliability centered maintenance that were identified in IG DoD Report No. 91-098, "Aircraft Depot Maintenance Programs."

DoD was in the process of implementing a maintenance concept called condition based maintenance-plus. Maintenance requirements under condition based maintenance-plus are driven by the need to repair or replace the components based on the actual condition of the component as diagnosed by embedded sensors or external diagnostic equipment. DoD has developed a time-phased plan to implement the condition based maintenance-plus initiative. The plan is to evaluate incorporating condition based maintenance-plus technology into new weapon systems, and legacy systems, where cost-effective. The procedures and schedules contained in the implementation plan appear reasonable. Although the implementation process was in the early stages, and we could not formulate any conclusions on the effectiveness of the program, continued management emphasis and oversight will be needed to ensure the condition base maintenance-plus initiative is effectively implemented as planned within the Military Departments.

REPORT NO. D-2003-130. Accountability and Control of Materiel at the Ogden Air Logistics Center. The report discusses compliance with policies and procedures used to account for and control materiel at Ogden Air Logistics Center. According to the Center Comptroller's Office, the FY 2003 budget for the operation of the depot was about $294.3 million. The D035K Wholesale and Retail and Shipping System showed that the value of the Center depot maintenance materiel inventory was about $60.5 million.

The Center did not effectively manage or control materiel stored in local maintenance shops. Inventory records had projected count errors of about 11 percent. The errors had overstatements valued at an estimated $6.2 million and understatements valued at an estimated $2.8 million. Also, about $9.5 million of unaccountable materiel and about $10.9 million of excess materiel was found on shop floors and in storage areas. As a result, the Center had inventories that were difficult to manage. Further, the unrecorded, excess materiel was not visible to satisfy needs elsewhere and, lacking visibility, allowed materiel to be subject to loss, obsolescence, and theft. Consequently, because of the unaccounted for inventory and excess materiel, the Center could have about $20.4 million in potential monetary benefits. Complying with Air Force guidance on management of materiel and performing an annual physical inventory that includes materiel located on shop floors and other storage areas, as well as materiel listed in the materiel processing system, should improve management oversight of maintenance materiel.

REPORT NO. D-2003-131. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program: Solid Rocket Motor Disposition. This report, which is one in a series requested by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, evaluates DoD management of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) solid rocket motor disposition facility project.

Although DoD spent $99.7 million to design and begin construction of a facility that would eliminate solid rocket motors, Russian officials informed DoD in January 2003 that Russia would not be able to provide the land allocation to support the facility. Because of local opposition in the Udmurt Republic, that facility will not be constructed. As a result, the United States may spend at least $44.9 million to build temporary storage facilities for missiles and upgrade Russian capabilities for burning solid rocket motors. Between January 2003 and April 2003, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) disbursed about $72,000 for maintenance and security of buildings and other infrastructure that DoD had provided at the project site to ensure that the DoD investment would be available to support other CTR projects in Russia. Negotiating an agreement with Russia on the disposal of solid rocket motors should ensure that DoD and Russia understand their respective responsibilities and commitments. Determining the future of the facilities and equipment that DoD purchased for the solid rocket motor disposition project will eliminate the need for securing those items. In addition, DTRA could improve its management of CTR projects by including a risk mitigation strategy in written acquisition plans, implementing a milestone decision review and program baseline process, and ensuring that project managers maintain documentation of actions they have taken.

On the positive side, DTRA has taken several steps to reduce DoD risks in the execution of ongoing and future projects. One initiative undertaken in conjunction with OUSD for Policy is the development of Joint Requirements Implementation Plans. DTRA has also issued instructions to ensure that acquisition plans are retained and contracting officer representative files are maintained. In addition, DTRA has implemented a phased approach to project execution to further reduce DoD risks. For solid rocket motors, DTRA has shifted the risk to Russia by agreeing to reimburse Russia after the propellant is burned.

PART II

PARTICIPATION ON MANAGEMENT ADVISORY TEAMS AND SPECIAL AUDIT/EVALUATION EFFORTS

Summary of the Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing - Participation on Management Advisory Teams

(Area Code 703 unless otherwise indicated)

Acquisition Governance Board—DoD Charge Cards (DAVID STEENSMA, 604-8903)
Lead Components: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

Army Intermodal and Distribution Platform Management Integrated Process Team (RON HODGES, 604-9592)
Lead Component: Army G-4 (Logistics) Support Activity

Business Management Modernization Program (DAVID STEENSMA, 604-8903)
Lead Component: Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

Commercial Activities Inventory Integrated Process Team (HENRY KLEINKNECHT, 604-9324)
Lead Components: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

Defense Acquisition Policy Working Group (JOHN MELING, 604-9091)
Lead Component: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

DLA/Honeywell Strategic Supplier Alliance Relationship (HENRY KLEINKNECHT, 604-9324)
Lead Components: Deputy Under Secretary of Defense(Acquisition Reform) and Defense Logistics Agency

DoD A-76 Integrated Process Team (ANELLA OLIVA, 604-9323)
Lead Components: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

DoD Investment Board (DAVID STEENSMA, 604-8903)
Lead Components: Defense Finance and Accounting Service and Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

Federal Information Security Management Act Information Assurance Integrated Process Team (WANDA SCOTT, 604-9049)
Lead Component: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)

Mechanization of Contract Administration (MOCAS) Integrated Process Team (JIM KORNIDES, 614-751-1400 x211)
Lead Components: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

Past Performance Integrated Process Team (BOBBIE SAU WAN, 604-9259)
Lead Component: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

PCIE Competitive Sourcing Roundtable (DAVID STEENSMA, 604-8903)
Lead Component: Inspector General, Department of Interior

Single Process Initiative Management Team (DEBORAH CARROS, 604-9217)
Lead Component: Defense Contract Management Agency

Summary of the Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing - Participation in Special Audit/Evaluation Efforts

Audit Committees:

Army Financial Statement Audit Committee (PAUL GRANETTO, 604-9101)
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DAVE VINCENT, 604-9109)
Defense Commissary Agency (DAVE VINCENT, 604-9109)
Defense Contract Audit Agency (PAUL GRANETTO, 604-9101)
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (PAUL GRANETTO, 604-9101)
Defense Information Systems Agency (RICHARD BIRD, 604-9102)
Defense Logistics Agency (PAUL GRANETTO, 604-9101)
Defense Security Service (BRIAN FLYNN, 604-9489)
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (LEON PEEK, 604-9587)
Missile Defense Agency (DAVE VINCENT, 604-9109)
National Reconnaissance Office (LEON PEEK, 604-9587)

Defense Finance and Accounting Service Assessment of Fund Balance With Treasury (BRIAN FLYNN, 604-9489)

Federal Audit Executive Council Multi-Agency Working Groups:

Government Wide Financial Statements (RICHARD BIRD, 604-9102)

Joint Audit Planning Groups:

Acquisition Program (MARY UGONE, 604-9002)
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) (DEBORAH CULP, 604-9335)
BRAC Education & Training Joint Cross Service Group (JCSG) (KENNETH VAN HOVE, 604-9564)
BRAC Headquarters & Support Activities JCSG (RON HODGES, 604-9592)
BRAC Industrial JCSG (DENNIS PAYNE, 604-8907)
BRAC Medical JCSG (MIKE JOSEPH, 757-872-4698)
BRAC Supply and Storage JCSG (TILGHMAN SCHRADEN, 604-9186)
BRAC Supply and Storage JCSG Working Group (TILGHMAN SCHRADEN, 604-9186)
BRAC Technical JCSG (BRUCE BURTON, 604-9071)
Construction, and Installation Support (DEBORAH CULP, 604-9335)
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